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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Civil Litigation Parallelism
The concept of res judicata-once the thing has been adjudged, that is
the end-has been part of the common law for more than five hundred years.I
In recent years the concept has been used in the United States with increased
frequency. The United States Supreme Court has put its imprimatur on the
expansion of the concept in three recent cases. In Blonder- Tounge Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation2 the Court rejected the mutuality re-
quirement and allowed a stranger to the first suit to use issue preclusion defen-
sively against the party who lost in the first proceeding. 3 The Court noted:
1. A. VESTAL, RESJUDICATA/PRECLUSION, at V-28 (1969).
2. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
3. Id. at 350.
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Undeniably, the court-produced doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
is undergoing fundamental change in the common-law tradition.
In its pristine formulation, an increasing number of courts have re-
jected the principle as unsound. Nor is it irrelevant that the abroga-
tion of mutuality has been accompanied by other developments-
such as expansion of the definition of "claim" in bar and merger
contexts and expansion of the preclusive effects afforded criminal
judgments in civil litigation-which enhance the capabilities of the
courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly. 4
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,5 the Court allowed a stranger to the first suit
to use issue preclusion offensively against the losing party in the first suit.
In addition, the Court allowed the first proceeding in equity to preclude the
trial of fact issues to the jury in the second action.6 Finally, the Court inMon-
tana v. United States7 held that the United States was bound by the first ad-
judication because it was a participating nonparty. It controlled the litiga-
tion to some extent and supported the activities of the losing party in the
suit.8 This decision is noteworthy because (1) issue preclusion was applied
against the United States, (2) a participating nonparty was precluded, and
(3) it suggested that a party-even the United States-might be bound by
an adjudication of a matter of law.
At the same time that the federal courts have been using issue preclu-
sion with greater frequency on the civil side, the state courts also have been
expanding its application and have been declaring that mutuality of estop-
pel is no longer required. 9 On the criminal side, the courts have awakened
to the possibilities that preclusion offers. As soon as the requirement for
mutuality disappeared, courts could view a criminal conviction as generally
preclusive on a fact issue in a subsequent civil action.10
Issue preclusion is now recognized as arising from criminal proceedings
so that further litigation may be precluded in subsequent criminal or civil
actions. Courts have evidenced a growing willingness to use issue preclu-
sion on the criminal side. Again, federal courts have taken a leading role
in using issue preclusion in successive criminal prosecutions.1" Issue preclu-
4. Id. at 327.
5. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
6. Id. at 332-33, 337.
7. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
8. Id. at 155, 164.
9. See, e.g., Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 765 (Me. 1979).
10. See Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWAL. REV. 281,
321 (1980).
11. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970); Hernandez-Uribe v. United
States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976); Pena-
Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1968).
A recent Supreme Court case prevents the federal courts from expanding issue
preclusion to cover the situation of a stranger to the first prosecution claiming issue
preclusion against the state. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
3
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sion arising from a criminal proceeding is now perceived as perhaps
precluding, under the full faith and credit clause, further litigation in a civil
or criminal proceeding in another jurisdiction. 12
Claim preclusion-the other aspect of resjudicata-also has been given
a greater role in minimizing repetitive litigation.' 1 The Second Restatement
ofJudgments has articulated the concept in a manner that should result in
an even greater expansion of its application,14 although its use in some areas
has not yet been firmly established. 15
B. Problems Posed
When an individual engages in criminal conduct, he may commit more
than a single crime. Multiple crimes may arise from a single event when
(1) the criminal commits several crimes against one individual, (2) the
criminal commits multiple crimes against different individuals, (3) a single
event constitutes crimes under the laws of several jurisdictions, or (4) a com-
bination of these possibilities occurs.
1. One Victim-Multiple Crimes
When an offender kidnaps a single victim, the offender probably com-
mits several crimes. For example, the defendant may have tampered with
the car to force the victim to stop in the countryside where the victim then
was kidnapped. Although there might be some question, most authorities
would hold that this involves separate, not included, crimes. Two distinct
crimes were committed against a single individual. If the crimes commit-
ted against the one individual are not related, except in time and location,
multiple prosecutions may be possible.1 6
On the other hand, a defendant might be charged with attempting to
kidnap as well as kidnapping. The former is an included offense. The defend-
ant can be convicted of only one of the offenses, i.e., either the principal of-
fense or the included offense.1 7 A crime is an included offense under the
Model Penal Code when
12. Vestal, Criminal Prosecutions: Issue Preclusion and Full Faith and Credit, 28
KAN. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1979).
13. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971). The Court referred to the "expansion of the definition of
'claim' in bar and merger contexts" as a development that enhances "the
capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly." Id. at 327.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).
15. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 464, 498-500 (1981).
16. See generally Part II.B. infra.
17. See generally id.
[Vol. 47
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(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts re-
quired to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense
charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public
interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its
commission. 18
The problem of the lesser included offense primarily arises in the jury in-
structions concerning the crimes for which the defendant can be found guilty.
It also may arise when the prosecutor attempts to try a defendant for a crime
that was an included offense in an earlier prosecution.
2. Multiple Victims-Multiple Crimes
A criminal commits different crimes against different victims when, for
example, he holds up a group of individuals and robs them. Each robbery
is a separate crime and the criminal could be tried for any one of the crimes
committed. When this occurs, the prosecutor may prosecute the defendant
for one of the robberies and learn about the witnesses and the possible
defenses. Whether the state wins or loses, the prosecutor is better-prepared
to prosecute the defendant for robbing the other individuals. Under the
developing law, the prosecutor may even be able to claim issue preclusion
against a losing defendant because of fact determinations made in the first
prosecution. 19 Is this serial prosecution of the defendant for a single event
essentially unfair? Certainly it deserves the very careful consideration of the
legal profession.
3. Crimes Against Laws of Several Jurisdictions
Some wrongdoers may violate, by a single act, the laws of several jurisdic-
tions and, thus, can be prosecuted by several different governments. 20 The
existence of the federated government in the United States makes this situa-
tion possible. One example is robbery of a store that has a postal substa-
tion, which may involve both a federal and state offense and which may lead
to prosecutions by both the affected state and the federal government.
The problem of duplicative prosecutions has always involved a number
of different, unrelated situations. Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the
criminal courts usually have not invoked an approach similar to that used
on the civil side. The concept of requiring that all criminal aspects of a fact
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
19. Vestal, supra note 10, at 312.
20. The problem of prosecutions by different jurisdictions for a single act arose
early in the life of the republic. See, e.g., Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 447 (1846);
id. at 450-56 (McLean, J., dissenting); State v. Brown, 2 N.C. (Mart.) 73 (1794).
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situation be handled in a single prosecution is relatively foreign to the courts
and legal scholars. Admittedly, the parallelism to the civil side is not com-
plete; the underlying principles are not precisely the same. Nevertheless,
it is profitable to examine criminal procedure in light of the preclusive con-
cepts of the civil side to see if lessons may be learned and similarities may
be identified.
C. Underlying Principles and Purposes Served
Apparently no one has attempted to consider the problem of duplicative
or multiple prosecutions in any rational, comprehensive way. No analysis
has examined the relevant considerations, the purposes served by repetitive
prosecutions, and the negative impact of the practice.
Duplicative prosecutions, as indicated above, can occur in a number
of quite different situations. One may involve simply the prosecutor's at-
tempt to try a defendant on the same charge after the defendant has been
tried once. At this point the concept of double jeopardy becomes significant.
The second situation involves an individual who, in one episode, has com-
mitted a number of criminal acts. Is society best served by allowing a pros-
ecutor to try the defendant serially for all of the crimes committed? Or should
consideration be given to the defendant? Should society insist that the pros-
ecutor try the defendant only once for all of the crimes that the prosecutor
wishes to join? The third situation arises when a single act is a crime under
the laws of more than one jurisdiction. Should each jurisdiction be allowed
to prosecute the defendant? Or is society best served by allowing only a single
prosecution? If the latter serves society best, which jurisdiction will be allowed
to prosecute? Will it be simply a race to trial? The fourth situation involves
multiple crimes and multiple jurisdictions. This simply compounds the prob-
lems related above and the solution must be a composite of those reached
in dealing with the simpler problems.
Do common problems or common threads join the different situations
together? The defendant, it can be said, is interested in having society deal
expeditiously with the alleged criminal episode and decide what sanctions
are to be invoked. Is the defendant's interest in having the matter terminated
at some reasonable point an overriding consideration that should weigh
heavily in any ultimate determination of what is to be done? What of the
interest of society? Obviously punishment of the defendant is important.
But what of the waste of the time of the courts, the bar, the witnesses, and
the defendant in repetitive litigation of the same factual situation? Should
society demand that punishment be meted out in a single proceeding? Or
can issue preclusion minimize the waste of valuable resources, so that
repetitive prosecutions become less obnoxious? Does society loseif it allows
the harassment of a defendant? Is the criminal justice system being used for
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A consideration of the principles involved could indicate that prior pro-
ceedings under the same circumstances should have some preclusive effect
in criminal prosecutions. It may be appropriate for a criminal court to con-
sider earlier proceedings and the possibly preclusive effect on any subsequent
attempt to prosecute for any part of the criminal episode.
II. SINGLE JURISDICTION-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Introduction
The problem of double jeopardy arises when the defendant is tried more
than once for an occurrence involving one offended party. The multiple pros-
ecutions may involve a second prosecution after a conviction, after an ac-
quittal, or after a proceeding that ended without a final determination of
guilt or innocence, e.g., when the court declares a mistrial.
The primary emphasis of this Article is not the United States Supreme
Court's interpretations of federal constitutional double jeopardy protections.
Some discussion of the protections, however, is warranted. The fifth amend-
ment double jeopardy protections will serve as a useful backdrop to the array
of further protections against multiple prosecutions supplied by the states.
The discussion here of federal double jeopardy protections will be brief; no
comprehensive treatment is attempted. 21
The concept of double jeopardy in criminal prosecutions is similar to
that of claim preclusion in civil cases. 22 Both concepts share a common
ancestry in Roman law, 23 but they have developed differently. On the one
hand, claim preclusion generally has developed to prevent a civil plaintiff
from asserting, in a second suit, any claim arising out of the same core of
operative facts giving rise to an invasion of his legally protected rights.24 For
example, a plaintiff in a suit for personal injury in an automobile accident
generally must join a claim for property damage in a single proceeding against
a defendant. Failure to join the property damage claim in the first proceeding
will preclude the plaintiff from raising it against the same defendant in a
subsequent suit. 25 Double jeopardy differs from claim preclusion in several
21. An excellent statement of the principles of double jeopardy is contained
in Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1980). See also Gilday&Gillen,Jeopardy-
Meandering Through Mandates and Maneuvers, 6 N. KY. L. REV. 245 (1979); Westen
& Drubel, Toward a General Theoy of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 81.
22. Claim preclusion, a part ofresjudicata, can be defined as foreclosing fur-
ther litigation on a claim. A claim, in turn, can be defined as the core of operative
facts constituting a wrong against a single plaintiff. See generally A. VESTAL, supra
note 1, at 43-48.
23. M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLEJEOPARDY 6 (1969).
24. A. VESTAL, supra note 1, at 43-48.
25. Id. at 62-67.
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respects. First, the parties in criminal cases differ from those in civil suits.
The state takes the place of the civil plaintiff and represents the interests of
all parties injured by the criminal episode, unlike civil plaintiffs who each
represent their own interests. Second, different terminology is used. Instead
of a lawsuit there is a prosecution; a claim is a criminal transaction or episode.
Finally, the preclusive effect of the judgment varies. As shown below, the
state can bring multiple prosecutions for events in the same criminal trans-
action without violating double jeopardy protections.
The basis of double jeopardy protection is the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, which provides, "[N]or shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; ... "26
The double jeopardy protection applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 27 Although the double jeopardy clause appears to be a sim-
ple, straightforward provision, its application is difficult. The United States
Supreme Court has described the language of the fifth amendment as "decep-
tively plain.' '28 The language, however, has caused problems "both subtle
and complex." 29 Not the least of these problems is the long series of Supreme
Court opinions interpreting the provision, which opinions "can hardly be
characterized as models of consistency and clarity" 30 and amount to "con-
ceptual confusion." 31 The Supreme Court expressed the purposes of dou-
ble jeopardy protections as follows:
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity .... 32
To determine whether the purposes of the protection will be served, two
issues must be resolved. First, at what stage in a criminal proceeding is a
defendant put in jeopardy so as to invoke the protections of the amendment?
Second, what constitutes the same offense for purposes of the amendment?
In dealing with the first question, the Supreme Court has adopted a
straightforward rule. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn in, 33 or when
the judge begins to hear the evidence in a nonjury trial. 34 The rule becomes
more complex when a decision is appealed or a mistrial is declared. 35 Thus,
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
28. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978).
29. Id.
30. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
31. Id. at 13.
32. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
33. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
34. Id.
35. Whether the prosecution has a right to appeal is not always clear. For a
discussion of this problem, see Westen & Drubel, supra note 21, at 122-55. When
[Vol. 47
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the determination of when jeopardy attaches "begins, rather than ends, the
inquiry as to whether the DoubleJeopardy Clause bars retrial. "36 Once that
issue has been resolved, there remains the issue of the meaning of "same
offense" as used in the double jeopardy clause.
B. Defining the Same Offense
1. Basic Concepts
The phrase "same offense" in the double jeopardy clause readily lends
itself to two interpretations. The offense described can refer to either (1) the
statutory description of a crime or offense 37 or (2) the course of the defen-
dant's actions in violating any of a number of criminal statutes. 38 When fewer
criminal prohibitions existed, the distinction in defining "offense" often was
not of great importance; when a defendant engaged in wrongful conduct
he probably violated only one criminal prohibition.
39
The advent of a greatly expanded range of criminal violations and sanc-
tions caused the distinction to become crucial. A single act or series of acts
of a defendant may violate several criminal prohibitions. 40 Defining an of-
fense by reference to statutory definitions of prohibited conduct would not
necessarily preclude multiple prosecutions for the same act. On the other
hand, keying the definition to the defendant's conduct would preclude suc-
cessive prosecutions based on the same act or series of acts. Definition of
an offense by statutory elements commonly is called the "same evidence"
test while the conduct-based definition is termed the "same transaction" test.
2. The Supreme Court's View of the Same Offense
In Blockburger v. United States,41 the Supreme Court adopted the same
evidence test to determine when there is a successive prosecution for the same
the defendant appeals a conviction seeking a declaration of a mistrial, the concept
of waiver of double jeopardy protection as continuingjeopardy may prevent a find-
ing of double jeopardy. See Gilday & Gillen, supra note 21, at 255-65.
36. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973).
37. The crucial variant is the legislative delineation of the elements of the
crime, not the actual proof required in a particular prosecution. See Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980).
38. An individual in a single criminal episode or transaction may violate
several statutes, as in the case of a bank robbery followed by a high speed getaway.
The robber may have violated federal and state bank robbery statutes, assault
statutes, weapon registration statutes, traffic laws, and conspiracy statutes.
39. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 23, at 14-15.
40. For example, a defendant improperly selling a prescription drug could
violate three statutes by a single sale: selling narcotics without a physician's prescrip-
tion, selling an improperly labeled container, and facilitating the concealment and
sale of narcotics. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 387 (1958).
41. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
9
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offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. 42 The Court quoted Morey
v. Commonwealth43 to define a single offense as follows:
"A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each
statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the
defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.' 44
Thus, the double jeopardy protection afforded against successive prosecu-
tions extends no further than duplicative prosecutions for identical statutory
offenses or for greater and lesser included offenses. 45 For example, if a defen-
dant robbed a liquor store and assaulted a passerby on the street while exit-
ing the store, successive prosecutions would be permitted. Therefore, dou-
ble jeopardy protection does not rise to the level of claim preclusion on the
civil side of the court.
3. Included Offenses
When one individual engages in criminal conduct involving another per-
son, the criminal may commit several crimes. For example, when A
murdered B, A may have inflicted great bodily harm on B prior to the
murder. A also might have taken property from B. All of these criminal acts
may have been part of a single group of operative facts. When A is prosecuted
for the criminal conduct, the question arises whether he can be prosecuted
for each act serially or whether prosecution for one act will bar prosecution
for another. This involves the distinction between separate and included
offenses.
The concept of included offenses has two variants: (1) prosecution for
the greater offense 45 before prosecution for the lesser included offense4 7 and
(2) prosecution for the lesser included offense before prosecution for the
greater offense. Prosecution of the lesser included offense after the greater
offense is not permitted under the double jeopardy clause. 48 By definition
the greater offense contains all the elements of the lesser included offense;
thus, a determination of guilt or innocence of the greater offense precludes
prosecution for the lesser included offense. 49
42. Id. at 304.
43. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
44. 284 U.S. at 304 (quoting 108 Mass. at 434).
45. See Part II.B.3. infra.
46. A greater offense is an offense that includes all the elements of another
offense. For example, first degree murder includes all the elements of second degree
murder.
47. A lesser included offense is an offense, all the elements of which are in-
cluded in another offense. For example, all the elements of second degree murder
are included in first degree murder.
48. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1977) (citing Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977)).
49. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1977).
[Vol. 47
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Prosecution of the greater offense after the lesser included offense also
is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause,5 0 but the determination of the
relationship of the two offenses is more complex. The test recently laid down
by the Supreme Court seems to differentiate between precluded and not
precluded offenses based on whether the purported greater offense necessarily
must be proved in the same mode as the lesser.5 For example, a prosecu-
tion arising out of an automobile-pedestrian accident for failure to reduce
speed would not bar a subsequent prosecution for reckless manslaughter if
the reckless manslaughter charge could be proved without using the proof
of failure to reduce speed. A second prosecution may be brought if proof
of the lesser included offense charged in the first prosecution is not necessary
to prove the greater offense charged in the second prosecution.5 2 Thus, the
protection from duplicative prosecutions when the lesser included offense
is prosecuted before the greater offense appears severely limited. 53
C. The Same Transaction Test
In his concurring opinion inAshe v. Swenson,54 Justice Brennan expressed
his view that the same evidence test is not constitutionally mandated. 55 He
severely criticized the same evidence test for failing to protect adequately
the interests represented by the double jeopardy clause. 56 Recognizing the
50. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977). Considerations of issue
preclusion may arise even though double jeopardy is not implicated. See id. at 166
n.6 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
51. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 418-20 (1980).
52. Id.
53. Id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) provides a
similar limitation on multiple prosecutions:
(1) Prosecution forMultiple Offenses; Limitation on Convictions. When the same
conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one
offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may
not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if:
(a) one offense is included in the other, as defined in Subsection
(4) of this Section ....
(4)...
An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense
charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a
less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property
or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish
its commission.
54. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
55. Id. at 452-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
11
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validity of these concerns, several states protect against the harms resulting
from successive prosecutions. This has been done through case law, court
rules, and statutes prohibiting or severely limiting successive prosecutions
arising out of the same transaction. Some of the state case law adopting the
same transaction test has been based on state constitutional prohibitions
against double jeopardy. 57 The Supreme Court has approved the states' af-
fording greater protections as a matter of state law than those afforded by
federal constitutional law. This protection may result from a state provi-
sion with identical wording to that of the federal provision; a state may not,
however, interpret a federal provision to afford greater protection than an
interpretation given it by the Supreme Court.5 8
What is the same transaction? Is the number of victims relevant? Does
the elapsed time or the number of crimes committed limit the transaction?
How does it compare with a claim in civil suits? The same transaction may
be described as a criminal episode or an" [uninterrupted] continuing course
of conduct." 9 The outer limits of a criminal transaction are not always clear,
but certain trends emerge from the case law.60 The limits of the same trans-
action ultimately will turn on the facts of each case. Accordingly, as more
appellate cases are reported, the limits of the test will develop.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the same transaction test used
in barring serial prosecutions closely resembles a claim in the context of claim
preclusion in a civil suit. Courts in civil cases often speak of a claim con-
stituting a "core of operative facts," 61 a concept quite similar but not com-
pletely analogous to the criminal "transaction." When a civil defendant's
conduct wrongs multiple individuals, each individual has a separate claim
against the defendant. The harming of more than one individual by a
criminal in a single transaction does not result in multiple claims.
D. The Dual Sovereign Problem
When an individual engages in criminal conduct, he may violate both
federal and state criminal laws. In rare occasions, he may violate the criminal
prohibitions of both a domestic jurisdiction and a foreign country. An ex-
ample of the former is when a defendant robs a small town store that also
contains the post office. He has violated state robbery statutes as well as
federal criminal statutes dealing with the post office. Both the state and the
federal government may wish to prosecute; should one prosecute, the other
is not barred by double jeopardy from prosecuting. 62 This phenomenon is
57. See Part III.B. infra.
58. SeeOregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooperv. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(1) (e) & Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
60. See Part III.C.1. infra.
61. See, e.g., Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1947).
62. See Speed v. United States, 518 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1975).
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termed the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. Double jeopardy limitations do
not apply to situations where dual sovereigns are involved. 63
III. SINGLE JURISDICTION-SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS FOR
CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST DIFFERENT
INTERESTS IN THE EPISODE
A. Introduction
When a criminal act either violates several criminal statutes or involves
several victims, the government might decide to prosecute the defendant
serially for each crime against each victim. For example, if the defendant
robbed A, B, C, and D at the same time, the government might prosecute
the defendant four times to insure at least one conviction.
On the civil side, when a single individual asserts rights arising from
a single transaction or occurrence against a single defendant, only one ac-
tion is allowed. In a typical tort case, for example, the injured party may
sue the tortfeasor one time and recover but once for all damages and injuries
sustained. 64
When this concept is carried over to the criminal side, it can be posed
in terms of a single prosecution by the state for a single episode. When the
defendant commits multiple, not included, crimes aginst a single person,
it may be urged that the prosecutor must include all the crimes he wishes
to prosecute in a single prosecution.
The application of this principle becomes more troublesome when multi-
ple victims are involved. When a robber holds up several people at the same
time, the question is whether multiple prosecutions for the single episode
are allowed. Can the state prosecute the defendant serially for the several
crimes committed, or must the state prosecute all the crimes in one trial?
If the latter is not done, should the state be barred from prosecuting the defen-
dant after the first trial?
In civil cases, each wronged individual has a separate claim against the
defendant. An adjudication of one injured person's claim would not preclude
a subsequent proceeding by another injured person. 65 On the criminal side,
however, the state has the right to proceed against the wrongdoer; the vic-
tim may not prosecute the criminal. Since the state has a single right, the
appropriate question might be whether the state can split its right against
the defendant.
63. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1959) (state prosecution
followed by federal prosecution on substantially same facts); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 132-39 (1959) (federal prosecution followed by state prosecution on
substantially same facts).
64. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
65. See generally 1BJ. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.411[1] (2d ed. 1980).
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The advantages of reduced harassment of the defendant and a more ef-
ficient allocation of judicial resources are achieved by requiringjoinder in
the criminal context. Wasting resources through unnecessary litigation is
a greater problem in the criminal context because society must bear the cost
of the prosecution and, often, the defense as well. Moreover, just as on the
civil side,66 there are many advantages in handling legal controversies in
the largest units possible.
An example of multiple crimes against a single individual is presented
in Walton v. State.67 The defendant broke into a woman's house and, on find-
ing the woman at home, raped her.68 The possibility of multiple crimes
against multiple victims is presented by Commonwealth v. Lockhart,69 wherein
the court posed the following hypothetical:
[I]f five individuals are robbed in a room at gunpoint, five separate
robberies have occurred since each victim was placed in apprehen-
sion by the acts of the assailant. We have previously held that where
separate crimes are committed against different individuals, a defen-
dant is not placed in doublejeopardy by being triedfor each crime, even though
the crimes took place at the same place and approximately the same
time.7 0
Ashe v. Swenson71 involved the same situation posited by the Lockhart court.
The United States Supreme Court held that the concept of collateral estop-
pel or issue preclusion was embodied in the protection against double jeopar-
dy. The Court was willing to apply issue preclusion in the multiple victim
situation, but it refused to apply some principle analogous to claim
preclusion. 72 Three concurringJustices, however, referred to "one criminal
episode" and urged the use of such a principle. 73 They su.ggested that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most limited
circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that
grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.' '74
66. A major thrust of modern practice is to force or allow litigation in the largest
units possible. The broadening of the definition of "claim," for preclusion pur-
poses, makes this possible. Expanding the use of the class action allows more en-
compassing suits. Permissive joinder of plaintiffs and defendants, and the use of
counterclaims, cross-claims, and impleader, all allow larger units of litigation. In
the federal courts, the handling of complex litigation under 28 U.S.C. 5 1407 (1976)
expands the size of the litigation handled by a single court.
67. 448 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
68. Id. at 694-95.
69. 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 60, 296 A.2d 883 (1972).
70. Id. at 63, 296 A.2d at 884-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
71. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
72. Id. at 445-46.
73. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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Although serial prosecution in the above situations is not prohibited by
the federal double jeopardy clause, such prosecution may be barred by state
law. How have the states dealt with these situations? Have state constitu-
tions been interpreted to counter this problem? Have states enacted statutes
on the subject? Does any state's common law protect against serial
prosecutions?
B. Modern Statutes and Case Law
Federal double jeopardy protection is limited by the same evidence test.75
Several states have expanded protections against duplicative prosecutions
to cover an entire criminal transaction. Some states use case law to accomplish
this, while others use statutes or court rules. The following presents the basic
state trends in the use of the same transaction test.
1. Statutory Solutions to Duplicative Prosecutions
a. Proposals by the American Law Institute, the American Bar
Association, and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws
The American Law Institute (ALI), the American Bar Association
(ABA), and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have proposed provisions that, if adopted, would require a single pros-
ecution for all crimes arising out of a single criminal transaction. The ALI
proposal is found in the Model Penal Code. Section 1.07(2)-(3) of the Model
Penal Code prohibits separate prosecutions as follows:
(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except
as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a defendant shall not
be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offenses
are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the
commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of
a single court.
(3) Authority of Court to Order Separate Trials. When a defen-
dant is charged with two or more offenses based on the same con-
duct or arising from the same criminal episode, the Court, on appli-
cation of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant, may order
any such charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice
so requires. 76
Section 1.07(2) begins with the premise that multiple offenses arising out
of the same criminal episode should be tried together. This result will follow
unless the defendant or the prosecutor applies to have the offenses tried
75. See Part II.B.2. supra.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (2)-(3) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
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separately. Several states have adopted the Model Penal Code approach,
either by statute77 or as a guide in case law determination. 78
In this formulation of the compulsoryjoinder rule, the criminal episode
serves as the boundary of the same transaction. The exact limits of a criminal
episode are not clearly established in the commentary to section 1.07, but
the history of the section is helpful. As originally proposed, section 1.07(2)
required joinder when
(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct; or
(b) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions moti-
vated by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objective,
and necessary or incidental to accomplishment of that objec-
tive; or
(c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions
motivated by a common purpose or plan and which result in the
repeated commission of the same offense or affect the same per-
son or the same persons or the property thereof. 79
The advisory committee had favored broadening this test to include all of-
fenses "based on a course of conduct having a common criminal purpose
or plan or involving repeated commission of the same kind of offense." 80
The council concluded that both this proposal and the section as it had been
proposed originally were too broad."' Accordingly, the section was changed
to include the criminal episode language to limit the scope of the section.
The difference between the proposals and the section as enacted is il-
lustrated in People v. Tulipane,82 wherein the defendant was charged with nine
crimes against property, all arising out of a two day crime spree.83 In such
a case, if the original version of section 1.07(2) or the advisory committee's
recommendation governed, the prosecutor would have had to try all nine
counts in a single proceeding. Under section 1.07(2) as originally proposed,
all nine crimes probably would be viewed as pursuant to plans that resulted
in repeated offenses against the same people or property.14 The advisory com-
mittee's proposal presents a clearer case because the group of offenses were
likely to be pursuant to a plan and were repetitions of the same kind of
offense.85 It is, however, unlikely that the two day spree would be considered
77. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 518-1-408(2) (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. 5
701-109(2) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. 55 131.505-.525 (1979).
78. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975).
79. MODEL PENAL CODE 51.08(2) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
80. MODEL PENAL CODE 51.07, Status of Section, at 13 (Prop. Official
Draft, 1962).
81. Id.
82. 192 Colo. 476, 560 P.2d 94 (1977).
83. Id. at 477-78, 560 P.2d at 95.
84. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
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one criminal episode under section 1.07(2) as enacted. 86
The ABA approach to compulsory joinder of criminal prosecutions is
nearly identical to that of the Model Penal Code. Section 1.3(c) of the ABA
Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance provides:
A defendant who has been tried for one offense may thereafter move
to dismiss a charge for a related offense, unless a motion forjoinder
of these offenses was previously denied or the right ofjoinder was
waived as provided in section (b). The motion to dismiss must be
made prior to the second trial, and should be granted unless the court
determines that because the prosecuting attorney did not have suf-
ficient evidence to warrant trying this offense at the time of the first
trial, or for some other reason, the ends ofjustice would be defeated
if the motion were granted . 7
Related offenses are defined in section 1.3(a) as offenses "within the jurisdic-
tion of the same court and ... based on the same conduct or... [arising]
from the same criminal episode.' '88 Thus, the ABA standard, like Model
Penal Code section 1.07(2), protects against multiple prosecutions for the same
offense. Acquittal or conviction is irrelevant; the fact of prosecution trig-
gers the section.8 9 At least three states have followed the ABA approach. 0
The difference between the ABA standard and Model Penal Code sec-
tion 1.07(2) lies in the effect of the defendant's failure to move for joinder.
The ABA standard, section 1.3(b), provides that "[a] defendant's failure
to so move constitutes a waiver of any right ofjoinder as to related offenses
with which the defendant knew he was charged.'"91 On the other hand, Model
Penal Code section 1.07(2) imposes no such requirement on the defendant;
joinder is automatic, unless the court orders otherwise. 92 Drafters of the ABA
standard preferred to place the burden on the defendant because he, as the
party intended to be protected by the standard, should have the choice
whether to use the protection. In addition, the difference in burden would
obviate the need for severance hearings as required under Model Penal Code
section 1.07(2) . 3
Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 471,94 proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, offers a more limited
86. See id. § 1.07(2).
87. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TOJOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 1.3(c) (Ap-
proved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
88. Id. § 1.3(a).
89. Id., Commentary, at 23-24.
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926 (1978); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.151; WASH.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.3(c).
91. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 87, § 1.3(b).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
93. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 87, § 1.3(b), Commentary, at 22.
94. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 471.
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protection. The rule bars a second prosecution for a related offense if the
prior prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction. 95 A "related offense"
is defined as one arising out of the same criminal episode. 96 As under the
ABA standard, the burden is on the defendant to move for joinder of the
related offenses. If the defendant does not know of all the crimes charged,
he is not required to move for joinder. 97 To date, no state has adopted the
Uniform Rule.
Of the three proposed approaches, the ABA standard is preferable. The
Model Penal Code proposal introduces inefficiency by requiring severance
hearings. The ABA standard, however, reduces the need for hearings because
the failure to move forjoinder involves no hearing and motions for joinder
are to be granted perfunctorily. The Uniform Rule does not provide ade-
quate protection because the defendant must be either convicted or acquit-
ted before the protection attaches. A trial may terminate in some manner
other than an acquittal or a conviction, e.g., a mistrial. Thus, the literal word-
ing of Uniform Rule 471 appears to offer less protection than either the Model
Penal Code or the ABA standard.
b. Other Statutory Solutions
Most of the states that have adopted same transaction compulsoryjoinder
by statute have departed from the ABA, Model Penal Code, and Uniform
Rule approaches. The statutes represent two trends in wording. The first
trend involves statutes prohibiting reprosecution for the "same act or of-
fenses." At least two states follow this trend. 98 Literally, such wording does
not mandate the use of the same transaction test. Courts can construe the
words "same act" to reduce substantially the potential protection afforded
by the statute. For example, in Beckley v. State,99 the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals considered rape and burglary to be different acts and, thus,
separately prosecutable.100 If state legislatures intended to offer anything
beyond federal double jeopardy protection, a broader reading of these statutes
seems warranted.
A second trend in the compulsoryjoinder statutes is evidenced by states
that have adopted statutes containing "same transaction" or similar
language. At least three states have followed this approach. 10 1 The most




98. See ALA. CODE § 15-3-8 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-3 (Smith-Hurd
1972).
99. 357 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
100. Id. at 1024.
101. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. 5
46-11-503 (1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.40 (McKinney 1971).
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reprosecution for crimes arising out of the "same transaction."10 2 Unlike
other states, Montana defines "same transaction" as follows:
(1) The term "same transaction" includes conduct consisting of:
(a) a series of acts or omissions which are motivated by a pur-
pose to accomplish a criminal objective and which are
necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of that ob-
jective; or
(b) a series of acts or omissions which are motivated by a com-
mon purpose or plan and which result in the repeated com-
mission of the same offense or affect the same person or
persons or the property thereof.10 3
Such an expansive definition truly offers a defendant protection from serial
prosecutions. Minnesota bars reprosecution for crimes arising out of the
"same conduct," 10 4 while New York uses the "same transaction" lan-
guage.105 State legislatures should define the bounds of the transaction or the
conduct giving rise to the bar to prevent the courts from having to search
for a suitable definition.
2. Judicial Solutions
When state legislatures have not barred duplicative prosecutions by
statute, some courts have established such a rule by interpreting state dou-
ble jeopardy clauses, by finding a common law doctrine requiring joinder,
or by invoking the administrative power of the court. The following describes
the efforts of various state appellate courts.
a. Interpretation of State Constitutions
A state may provide greater protection to criminal defendants than does
the Federal Constitution. 106 This protection may take the form of the state's
interpretation of its constitution. The identical wording of a federal provi-
sion found in a state constitution, e.g., a double jeopardy clause, may pro-
duce this result. State supreme courts, however, may not interpret federal
constitutional provisions to provide greater protections than those provided
by the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court.10 7
State constitutions frequently contain a double jeopardy clause. The
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. White'08 interpreted the double jeopardy
clause of the Michigan Constitution to require a single prosecution for crimes
arising out of the same transaction. 10 9 In White, the defendant abducted a
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-501(1) (1981).
103. Id.
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.035 (West 1964).
105. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 9 40.40 (McKinney 1971).
106. See cases cited note 58 supra.
107. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
108. 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973).
109. Id. at 257-58, 212 N.W.2d at 227-28.
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woman and later assaulted and raped her. The defendant was first tried and
convicted of kidnapping, and in a second trial he was convicted of rape and
felonious assault. 10 In sustaining a plea of double jeopardy based on the
Michigan Constitution" 1 with respect to the second trial, the court sum-
marized its reasoning as follows:
The use of the same transaction test in Michigan will promote
the best interests of justice and sound judicial administration. In a
time of overcrowded criminal dockets, prosecutors and judges should
attempt to bring to trial a defendant as expeditiously and econom-
ically as possible. A far more basic reason for adopting the same
transaction test is to prevent harassment of a defendant. The join-
ing of all charges arising out of the same criminal episode at one trial
" * * * will enable a defendant to consider the matter closed and
save the costs of redundant litigation." It will also help " * * * to
equalize the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal litigants" and
prevent prosecutorial sentence shopping. "In doing so, it recognizes
that the prohibition of double jeopardy is for the defendant's protec-
tion." 11 2
Texas also has followed the same transaction test since 1876.113 The
Texas rule is the constitutional "carving doctrine," which allows the state
to "carve the minor part of the transaction and convict on that, or... carve
the major part of the transaction and convict on that. However, the State
can carve only the one time."114 Texas also prohibits by statute multiple
same transaction prosecutions for property offenses." 5
Oregon has adopted the same transaction doctrine as part of its state
constitutional double jeopardy protection. "6 Defendants are also protected
from multiple prosecutions by a statutory same transaction test." 7 West
Virginia adopted the same transaction test in 1979 as a matter of state con-
stitutional law.118
b. State Common Law
State courts may not always be able to interpret the state constitution
to provide the same transaction test. In addition, the state legislature may
110. Id. at 250-51,212 N.W.2d at 223-24.
111. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
112. 390 Mich. at 258-59, 212 N.W.2d at 228 (quoting People v. White, 41
Mich. App. 370, 378, 200 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1972)).
113. See Quitzow v. State, 1 Tex. Crim. 47 (1876).
114. Paschal v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 111, 114, 90 S.W. 878, 880 (1905).
115. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 3.01-.02 (Vernon 1974).
116. State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 457-58, 497 P.2d 1191, 1198 (1972) (result
overruled, but not rationale, in State v. Hammang, 271 Or. 749, 756, 534 P.2d
501, 505 n.4 (1975)).
117. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 131.505-.525 (1979).
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not have enacted protective legislation. In such cases, the state may, as a
matter of common law, prohibit multiple prosecutions for crimes arising from
the same transaction. Tennessee has followed this approach beginning with
State v. Covington. 119 The common lawtest in Tennessee functions on a case-
by-case basis; the overriding consideration is whether the state indirectly
is trying to impose multiple punishments. 120 Thus, some play is left in the
joints because an acquittal in a first proceeding followed by a conviction in
a second proceeding would not impose multiple punishments for crimes aris-
ing out of the same transaction.
c. General Supervisory Powers of Courts
The final method by which state appellate courts may provide extended
protection is through their general supervisory powers over rules of criminal
procedure. The courts may follow two approaches. First, the rules of criminal
procedure may require joinder of offenses arising out of the same transac-
tion. At least two states have followed this approach by adopting rules similar
to the ABA standard.1 21
Second, state appellate courts may require joinder of offenses by exer-
cising the general judicial supervisory power. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey followed this approach in State v. Gregory.122 The defendant was charged
with the sale of one envelope of heroin to an undercover agent. When the
prosecution began, the prosecutor knew that the defendant at the time of
the sale possessed enough envelopes "to yield between four and five hun-
dred decks of heroin."1 23 The defendant was convicted on the sale charge
and the conviction was affirmed. The state then prosecuted the defendant
for both possession and possession with intent to distribute. At the second
trial, he was convicted on both counts and received "concurrent State prison
sentences to run consecutively to the sentence imposed ... for the sale." 124
On appeal, the superior court, with the consent of the state, set aside the
conviction for possession and affirmed the conviction for possession with in-
tent to distribute. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered, on appeal
of the superior court's decision, whether the doctrine of double jeopardy
barred the second prosecution. The court stated, "For present purposes we
need not rest on constitutional grounds for the just result we seek may readily
be attained by our exercise of the broad administrative and procedural powers
vested in us by our State Constitution." 125 The court considered the Model
Penal Code 6ind concluded that the case was the appropriate vehicle for the
119. 142 Tenn. 659, 663-64, 222 S.W. 1, 2 (1920).
120. Walton v. State, 448 S.W.2d 690, 696 (1969).
121. See FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3.151; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.3.
122. 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257 (1975).
123. Id. at 511, 333 A.2d at 257.
124. Id. at 512, 333 A.2d at 258.
125. Id. at 518, 333 A.2d at 261.
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adoption of a rule dealing with the "compulsory joinder of known offenses
based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode." 1 26
The court concluded that the interests of fairness, reasonable expectations,
economy, and convenience would be promoted by such a rule. The court
examined the facts of the case and reversed the decision of the superior court,
which had affirmed the conviction.1 27 Such a use of the supervisory power
of the court has been recognized in other states, 128 as well as in Canada.1 29
C. Problems and Limitations of the Compulsory Joinder Doctrine
While compulsory joinder of offenses has several advantages, its applica-
tion is not simple. Problems arise in defining the bounds of a criminal trans-
action, in handling situations when a defendant pleads guilty to one offense
included in the transaction, when different courts have jurisdiction over
crimes in the criminal transaction, and when the prosecutor does not know
of all the offenses at the time of prosecution.
1. Definition of a Transaction
Defining the same transaction is difficult, but some lines can be drawn.
The Texas carving doctrine'3 illustrates the problem. According to one
writer, the Texas courts have not consistently applied the doctrine. The courts
have at different times defined a criminal transaction as "(1) all acts com-
mitted at the same time and place; (2) one act; (3) one act and one viola-
tion; (4) one continuous transaction; [and] (5) all offenses involving the same
evidence, facts and elements."' 3 1 The confusion in Texas is illustrated by
the statement in Staples v. State 32 that "both transactions are based on the
same transaction."1 33
One consideration when the crimes in the transaction are intentional
crimes is whether a common criminal intent is involved. 3 4 For example,
126. Id. at 521, 333 A.2d at 263.
127. Id. at 521-23, 333 A.2d at 263-64.
128. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
129. Under the Canadian doctrine, a court, through its own inherent power,
can terminate proceedings that abuse the process of the court. This can result in
a practice similar to barring multiple prosecutions for the same transaction. See
Wray, The Abuse of Power Doctrine in Canadian Criminal Law, 34 U. TORONTO
FACULTY L. REV. 159, 170-75 (1976).
130. See notes 113-15 and accompanying text supra.
131. Comment, One Transaction-One Conviction, The Texas Doctrine of Carving,
25 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 630-31 (1973).
132. 76 Tex. Crim. 367, 175 S.W. 1056 (1915).
133. Id. at 375, 175 S.W. at 1060 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
134. See State v. Ahuna, 52 Hawaii 321, 324, 474 P.2d 704, 706 (1970) (court
stated that same transaction test "looks to a person's behavior.., and treats the
consequences of the same transaction, episode, or conduct as constituting one of-
fense for the purpose of a double jeopardy plea").
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if a defendant burglarized a house with no intent to rape its occupant, the
crimes of burglary and rape, should a rape occur, may be held to arise from
separate transactions with no common criminal intent.135
When two offenses requiring proof of intent or one intentional offense
and one unintentional offense are part of a course of conduct, common in-
tent may not indicate accurately the bounds of the same transaction. In these
cases, the limits of the transaction typically turn on the elapsed time between
different acts in the transaction. For example, an individual may violate
several traffic laws, which do not require intent, and subsequently assault
a police officer, which requires intent. 136 All the offenses would be part of
the same transaction if they were part of a "continuous course of conduct. 137
Two hours between the traffic offenses and the assault might indicate separate
transactions while a few minutes would indicate a single transaction. 38 As
in the definition of a claim on the civil side, the geographical location of the
various events also would be relevant in deciding whether they are parts of
the same transaction.139
When a legislature prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same trans-
action without defining a transaction, the courts must define the term.
Similarly, when the courts interpret a state constitution or the common law
or exercise the general supervisory powers of the courts to prohibit same
transaction multiple prosecutions, the transaction must be defined.
2. Pleas of Guilty and Nolo Contendere
A second problem created by the same transaction doctrine is the treat-
ment of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to less than all of the offenses
committed in the episode. For example, a defendant who committed theft
and murder in the same episode may plead guilty to the theft charge and
claim a bar to subsequent prosecution on the murder charge. Some states
would not allow such a bar.' 40 The Model Penal Code requires the opposite
result. 14 Courts that allow no bar to arise from a plea of guilty or nolo con-
135. See Walton v. State, 448 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
136. See Crampton v. 54-A Dist.Judge, 397 Mich. 489, 499-502, 245 N.W.2d
28, 32-33 (1976); State v. Krech, 312 Minn. 461, 463-64, 252 N.W.2d 269, 271-72
(1977).
137. State v. Krech, 312 Minn. 461, 467, 252 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1977).
138. See State v. Aiu, 59 Hawaii 92, 93-98, 576 P.2d 1044, 1046-48 (1978) (car
theft and police chase in close time proximity held part of same transaction); State
exrel. Johnson v. Hamilton, -. W. Va. __, 266 S.E.2d 125, 127-29, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1036 (1980) (two murders in close time proximity constitute part of same
transaction).
139. See, e.g., People v. Tulipane, 192 Colo. 476, 478-79, 560 P.2d 94, 96 (1977)
(burglaries at different locations constitute separate transactions).
140. See, e.g., State v. Hammang, 271 Or. 749, 534 P.2d 501 (1975).
141. This result is reached through a three-step analysis. First, MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.09(1)(b) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) bars subsequent prosecutions for
crimes when the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction and the se-
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tendere rely on policy analysis. The defendant has not been forced to pre-
sent his defense more than once nor to endure the burden of a prosecution.14 2
Furthermore, allowing the defendant to control the prosecution by the en-
try of a plea to a lesser charge has been termed an "absurd result.' 14 3
Some courts allow subsequent prosecution only if the court in which the
guilty plea was taken did not have jurisdiction over all the crimes in the
transaction. 144For example, if a defendant were charged with a traffic viola-
tion and manslaughter arising from the same episode, a plea of guilty to the
traffic violation in a traffic court that did not have jurisdiction over the
manslaughter charge would not preclude a manslaughter prosecution. This
result is consistent with the Model Penal Code approach. 45
When the plea of guilty is entered in a court of limited jurisdiction, a
no-bar rule can be justified by an analogy to claim preclusion on the civil
side. When a plaintiff brings a civil suit in a court of limited jurisdiction,
claim preclusion does not extend to any causes of action outside the juris-
diction of the court, even if those causes of action arose from the same ag-
gregation of facts. 146 Similarly, the state should not be barred from pros-
ecuting a second time when the defendant enters a plea in a court without
jurisdiction to entertain a prosecution for the whole transaction.
Arguments in favor of barring all subsequent prosecutions after a plea
of guilty are based on policy justifications of reduced harassment of the
defendant and more efficient use ofjudicial resources.147 This approach seems
appropriate in cases in which the prosecutor has discretion to plea bargain
and approves a plea of guilty.
Determining whether a bar or a no-bar rule is best is not simple; policies
favoring a bar do not clearly outweigh those against a bar. When a court
has jurisdiction over all the crimes arising out of a transaction, a bar seems
justified, particularly when the prosecutor has some influence over whether
the court can accept a guilty plea, such as in a plea bargaining context. The
cond prosecution should have been joined in the first prosecution under id. § 1.07.
Second, a conviction, as defined in id. § 1.08(3), for purposes of id. § 1.09(1)(b),
includes a guilty plea. Third, id. § 1.07(2) acts as a same transaction joinder rule.
Thus, id. § 1.09(1)(b) bars subsequent prosecution for a crime arising out of the
same transaction when the defendant pleads guilty to one of the crimes.
142. See State v. Hammang, 271 Or. 749, 756-57, 534 P.2d 501, 504 (1975).
143. Id. at 757, 534 P.2d at 505.
144. See, e.g., State v. Tamburro, 137 N.J. Super. 51, 55, 347 A.2d 796, 798
(App. Div. 1975).
145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
146. See A. VESTAL, supra note 1, at 415-16.
147. See State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 449, 497 P.2d 1191, 1195 (1972) (result
overruled, but not rationale, in State v. Hammang, 271 Or. 749, 756, 534 P.2d
501, 505 n.4 (1975)).
[Vol. 47
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 21
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/21
PRECLUDING DUPLICATIVE PROSECUTIONS
involvement of the prosecutor in the plea negotiations comes close to an ac-
tual prosecution and justifies the bar. On the other hand, in the absence of
prosecutorial involvement in the plea decision, the potential for abuse of the
bar rule becomes more important. A defendant may try to avoid prosecu-
tion for a serious offense based on a plea to a minor offense. In the absence
of prosecutorial involvement, a bar could leave the defendant substantially
in control of the prosecution of his case. Concerns about such abuse weigh
heavier in the two-court situation in which one court has limited jurisdic-
tion. If allowed to bar reprosecution, a plea of guilty in the limited jurisdic-
tion court would give a defendant an even more powerful tool to prevent
prosecution for serious offenses.
3. Jurisdiction in Different Courts
Some courts may not have jurisdiction to try all the offenses in a criminal
transaction. The authorities almost universally hold that a prosecution in
a court of limited jurisdiction does not bar a later prosecution for crimes aris-
ing from the same transaction that were beyond the jurisdiction of the first
court. 148 This is a logical extension of the civil side's concept whereby claim
preclusion does not extend to issues that were beyond the subject matter
jurisdiction of the first court.149 For example, a prosecution in a limited juris-
diction municipal court for a fire code violation should not bar a negligent
homicide prosecution for deaths resulting from a fire caused by conduct con-
stituting the code violation. The state has never had the opportunity to pros-
ecute for the negligent homicide.
4. Offenses Unknown to the Prosecutor
When a prosecutor brings a prosecution, he may not know of all the
crimes that arose from the transaction. Several factors may contribute to
this situation. For example, an assault victim may die after the proceeding
has terminated; thus, the transaction would include homicide as well as
assault.1 5 0 In another case, the defendant may have concealed facts or
evidence from the authorities. In either case, a second prosecution should
not be barred.
A more troubling situation arises when the prosecutor's lack of
knowledge results from the failure of the police to forward a full report of
148. This situation commonly occurs either when court systems are bifurcated
in jurisdiction between misdemeanors and felonies or by types of offenses. See, e.g.,
State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 370 A.2d 264 (1977) (misdemeanor/felony distinc-
tion); State v. Tamburro, 137 N.J. Super. 51, 347 A.2d 796 (App. Div. 1975) (traffic
court/criminal court distinction).
149. See A. VESTAL, supra note 1, at 415-16.
150. SeelnreDennis B., 18 Cal. 3d 687,692, 557 P.2d514,518,135 Cal. Rptr.
82, 86 (1976) (construing a same transaction statute that barred multiple
punishments but not multiple prosecutions).
1982]
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the events. If the knowledge of the prosecutor includes that of the police,
subsequent prosecutions for the same transaction would be barred; if not,
the prosecutor could later reprosecute. The Hawaii Supreme Court in State
v. Solomon, 151 in interpreting a Hawaii statute that required knowledge by
the "appropriate prosecuting officer," 152 held that police officers were not
prosecutors.1 5 3 In Solomon, the police neglected to tell the prosecutor of all
the thefts of a defendant. As a result, the prosecutor charged only second
degree theft and not first degree theft. The court stated that the knowledge
requirement was "not intended to enable a defendant who gets to the court-
house faster than the prosecution to thereby eliminate a charge, or to allow
a defendant to take advantage of the fact that he has successfully concealed
part of his criminal activity from the prosecuting officers." 154
If the prosecutor should have been aware of the other offenses and was
not, courts will bar a second prosecution based on the same transaction.
Although no statute speaks of "facts the prosecutor knew or should have
known," courts will read such language into the statute.155 This appears to
prevent harassment by multiple prosecutions when a prosecutor fails to in-
vestigate the case adequately.
D. Summaty
The problem of multiple prosecutions arising from a situation when one
individual commits several crimes has not been resolved. The problem is
a discrete one involving (1) a single prosecutor, (2) a single episode, (3) a
single wrongdoer, (4) multiple criminal acts, and possibly (5) multiple per-
sons as targets of the acts. For example, one person intentionally may drive
his car into a crowd and injure several people. How should this situation
be handled? Are there any constitutional, statutory, or common law prin-
ciples that govern the prosecution of this criminal?
Proposals have been advanced to bar duplicate prosecutions for events
arising out of the same criminal transaction. Several states have adopted
one of these proposals either by statute, court rule, or case law. Other states,
acting independently, have reached the same result.
These states have provided protection beyond that required by the
Federal Constitution double jeopardy clause. In extending this protection,
those states have recognized the desirability of reduced harassment of criminal
defendants and the efficient use ofjudicial resources. Civil courts have long
recognized and employed these policy considerations through the doctrine
of claim preclusion.
151. 61 Hawaii 127, 596 P.2d 779 (1979).
152. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-109(2) (1976).
153. 61 Hawaii at 131, 596 P.2d at 782.
154. Id. at 134, 596 P.2d at 784.
155. See id. at 132, 596 P.2d at 782.
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A body of law is building up in the United States that deals with this
problem by barring multiple prosecutions for a single criminal episode. An
examination of the statutes and the decided cases, however, suggests that
the law still is not established. An examination of the practices of prosecuting
authorities seems to indicate that multiple prosecutions for a single episode
are relatively rare. Society seems to feel that multiple prosecutions for a single
criminal episode ordinarily should not occur. The interests of the defendant,
the courts, and society generally are best served by a single prosecution.
Multiple prosecutions in such a situation are viewed with suspicion.
IV. MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS-SINGLE ACT
A. Introduction
When an individual commits a criminal act, he may violate the laws of
more than one jurisdiction. Several sovereigns may wish to prosecute the
individual for the single episode. The following situations will be examined
separately: (1) successive prosecutions in different states, (2) state prosecu-
tion followed by federal prosecution, (3) federal prosecution followed by state
prosecution, (4) foreign prosecution followed by prosecution in the United
States, and (5) prosecution in an Indian court followed by federal prosecution.
B. Successive Prosecutions in Different States
Although considerations of time and location usually will separate con-
duct in different states into separate crimes, occasionally a single act will
violate the laws of two states.
Marshall v. State156 is such a case. The defendant was prosecuted in Il-
linois for forgery and counterfeiting school district bonds and pleaded guil-
ty. When he was prosecuted in Nebraska for the same crime, he urged the
Illinois prosecution as a bar to the Nebraska prosecution.1 5 7 The court re-
jected the claimed bar. This case suggests that, absent a statutory provision,
a state is not barred from prosecuting an individual because of a prior pros-
ecution in another state.158
156. 6 Neb. 120 (1877).
157. Id. at 121.
158. Several state statutes bar prosecution in that state after prosecution in
another state for the same act. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1980); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-112 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-108, 43-1224.1 (1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 656, 793 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-303 (1978); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 19-315 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. § 505.050 (1975);
MISS. CODEANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); MONT. CODEANN. § 46-11-504 (1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 171.070, 208.020 (1979); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 40.20-.30
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. Pamphlet 1980-1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13
19821
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Reprosecution in a second state also was discussed in a recent Califor-
nia case, People v. Comingore.159 The defendant drove a car from Glendale,
California, to Salem, Oregon, without the consent of the car's owner. The
defendant pleaded guilty in an Oregon court to unauthorized use of a vehi-
cle and was sentenced. While the defendant was on parole, he was arrested
in California and charged with auto theft and unlawfully driving or taking
a vehicle. He urged in the California proceeding that the Oregon prosecu-
tion barred the California proceeding.160 The court responded with the
California Penal Code section providing, "When an act charged as a public
offense is within the jurisdiction of another State or country, as well as of
this State, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the pros-
ecution or indictment therefor in this State." 161 The court observed that even
though the Federal Constitution does not bar successive prosecutions by dif-
ferent jurisdictions, a state may provide greater double jeopardy protection
through either its own constitution or a statute. 62 The court concluded that
under California law the California prosecution was barred by the prior ac-
tion in Oregon because the same conduct violated the statutes of both
states. 163
State v. Clover164 is another example of reprosecution in a second state.
The defendant committed a burglary in Missouri and took the property to
his home in Kansas. He was convicted in Kansas of possessing stolen prop-
erty and then convicted in Missouri for burglary and stealing. The Missouri
(1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25 (West 1958); id., tit. 22, 5 130 (West 1969);"
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Purdon 1973); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-1-404
(1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (1980).
Some state statutes do not specify prosecution in another state as a bar, but have
language broad enough to cover this situation. See IND. CODE ANN. S 35-41-4-5
(Burns 1979); IOWA CODE § 803.4 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West
1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1817 (1979); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 1.10 (1977); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1958).
Some state statutes bar prosecution in that state after prosecution in another state
for particular offenses, including importing stolen goods, dueling, and violating
laws concerning controlled substances. See ALA. CODE § 20-2-77 (1975); ARK. STAT.
ANN. 5 43-1423 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 712-1254 (1976); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 1353 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 5 (West 1970); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.64 (1968); MO. REV. STAT. § 541.050 (1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-31-27 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-134 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§11-12-5 (1969); S.C. CODE § 44-53-410 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-23 (1977);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 161.45 (West 1974).
159. 20 Cal. 3d 142, 570 P.2d 723, 141 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1977).
160. Id. at 144, 570 P.2d at 724, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
161. CAL. PENAL CODE 5 793 (West 1970).
162. 20 Cal. 3d at 145, 570 P.2d at 725, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
163. Id. at 148, 570 P.2d at 726, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
164. 500 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. App., Spr. 1973).
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court held that the earlier Kansas conviction did not bar the Missouri
prosecution. 165 The court rested its decision on the dual sovereign double
jeopardy rule, finding it "unnecessary to demonstrate that in fact and in
law the identity of offenses requirement was not met by the defendant and
such failure would deny his plea of former jeopardy." 166
A final example is Magness v. State, 167 in which the defendant robbed a
drug store in Arkansas and took contraband drugs to Oklahoma. He pleaded
guilty to possession of drugs in Oklahoma and was then convicted in Arkansas
of possession of contraband substances with intent to deliver.1 68 An Arkan-
sas statute provided:
When a person has been either acquitted or convicted, on the merits,
of an offense.., against another state.. . , the acquittal or convic-
tion is a bar to prosecution for an offense against this State,... when
the two offenses were committed in the same course of conduct and
are of the same character.1 69
Offenses of the same character were defined as offenses for which the elements
of proof were not substantially different.1 70 In making this determination
the court was to "compare the respective purposes of the laws defining the
two offenses, as such purposes relate to the particular course of conduct of
the defendant." 71 The statute further provided that any differences "at-
tributable solely to the fact that the defendant's conduct affected, in the same
manner, the person or property of two or more individuals... shall not
be considered in deciding whether the two offenses are of the same
character."1 72 The court in affirming the conviction stated that "the offenses
in the case at bar were not committed in the same course of conduct, and
are not of the same character as the misdemeanor to which Magness pleaded
guilty in Oklahoma. '173
C. State Prosecution Followed by Federal Prosecution
After a state prosecutes an individual for a particular act, the federal
government may choose to prosecute the same individual for the same act
as a violation of a federal law. Although some urge that this double prosecu-
tion violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court has held that it does not. InAbbate v. United
States,174 the Supreme Court upheld the federal conspiracy conviction of in-
165. Id. at 272-74.
166. Id. at 274.
167. 257 Ark. 564, 518 S.W.2d 479 (1975).
168. Id. at 564-65, 518 S.W.2d at 479-80.
169. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1224.1 (1977).
170. Id. § 43-1224.2.
171. Id.
172. Id. 5 43-1224.2(a) to (b).
173. 257 Ark. at 566, 518 S.W.2d at 481.
174. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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dividuals who previously had pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy in an
Illinois state court, holding that the federal prosecution was not barred under
the double jeopardy clause by the earlier state conviction. 175
Nevertheless, federal prosecution after a state prosecution may be barred
by statute. For example, if a state prosecutes for theft from a box car, pro-
secution in a federal court for theft from a common carrier or of goods in
interstate commerce will be precluded by a federal statute which provides
that" [a] judgment of conviction or acquittal on the merits under the laws
of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under this section for the same
act or acts." 176 Similar provisions exist throughout the United States Code, 177
but only a few cases have been reported under the provisions. One such case
is United States v. Porria.178 The defendant was convicted in a Washington
state court of receiving and withholding stolen property. The defendant
subsequently was indicted under federal law for larceny of property moving
in interstate commerce and receiving stolen property. The defendant claimed
that the state prosecution barred the federal prosecution. The district court
agreed with respect to the count of receiving stolen property, but denied the
bar as to the count dealing with the larceny of property using the same
evidence test.
1 79
A second approach to federal prosecution following state prosecution
is found in two federal statutes that provide for a suspension of state court
jurisdiction when there is an overriding federal interest because of a presiden-
tial or congressional assassination. '8 0 For example, one of the statutes pro-
vides, "If federal investigative or prosecutive jurisdiction is asserted for a
violation of this section, such assertion shall suspend the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion by a state or local authority, under applicable state or local law, until
federal action is terminated."I 8' This provision prevents the state prosecu-
tion until the federal action is terminated, at which point the state must decide
whether to proceed.
The United States Supreme Court recently has addressed the problem
of a state prosecution followed by a federal prosecution for the same event.
In Rinaldi v. United States,18 2 the defendant was convicted in a state court of
conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and
carrying a concealed weapon. He was later convicted in a federal court of
175. Id. at 196.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
177. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§80a-36, 1282(1976); 18U.S.C. §§660, 1992, 2101,
2117 (1976); 48 U.S.C. § 1704 (1976).
178. 255 F. 172 (W.D. Wash. 1918).
179. Id. at 172-73.
180. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751 (1976).
181. Id. § 1751.
182. 434 U.S. 22 (1977).
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conspiracy to affect interstate commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs
Act. 183 On appeal, the government acknowledged that the conviction had
been obtained in violation of the Petite policy of the Justice Department. 184
The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to permit the
government to seek a dismissal of the indictment. The district court refused
to dismiss the indictment, and the government and the petitioner appealed
from the denial of the motion to dismiss; the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district
court with orders to dismiss the indictment. 85 The Court stated that the
policy limits the discretion of the federal prosecutor to initiate prosecution
for violations of federal statutes.186 The refusal to allow duplicative prosecu-
tions is based on "the efficient management of limited Executive resources,"
the encouragement of local responsibility in law enforcement, and the pro-
tection of citizens "from any unfairness that is associated with successive
prosecutions based on the same conduct.'1 8 7 The opinion suggested that
the Petite policy should not be applied without exception, but that exceptions
would be few. Exceptions may arise " 'in instances of peculiar enormity, or
where the public safety ... [demands] extraordinary rigor.' "118
The Petite policy also was recently applied by the United States Supreme
Court in Thompson v. United States.'8 9 The defendant had been prosecuted
in a state court and subsequently tried and convicted in a federal court. 190
The Supreme Court noted that an exception to the policy "is made only
if the federal prosecution is specifically authorized in advance by the [Justice]
Department itself, upon a finding that the prosecution will serve 'compel-
ling interests of federal law enforcement.' "191 The Solicitor General con-
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
184. 434 U.S. at 24-25. The Petite policy was articulated in a Department of
Justice Press Release dated April 6, 1959, which stated:
In two decisions on March 30, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United
States reaffirmed the existence of a power to prosecute a defendant under
both Federal and state law for the same act or acts. That power, which the
court held is inherent in our Federal system, has been used sparingly by
the Department ofJustice in the past. The purpose of this memorandum
is to insure that in the future we continue that policy. After a state pro-
secution there should be no Federal trial for the same act or acts unless the
reasons are compelling.
Memorandum to United States Attorneys, quoted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1959, at
19, col. 2.
185. 434 U.S. at 24-26, 32.
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 28 (quoting Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 435 (1847)).
189. 444 U.S. 248 (1980) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 249.
191. Id. at 248.
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ceded in the Supreme Court that the United States attorney had not obtained
the authorization required before bringing the action. The Solicitor General
further had concluded that the prosecution in the federal court was "not sup-
ported by an independent compelling federal interest not satisfied by the
state prosecution for armed burglary." 192 The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals "for reconsidera-
tion in light of the Government's present position." 193
In light of the statutory provisions that bar a federal prosecution after
a state prosecution, the Petite policy, and the possible exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, duplicative federal prosecutions after state prosecutions usually
will not occur.
D. Federal Prosecution Followed by State Prosecution
As in the case of state prosecution followed by federal prosecution, the
United States Supreme Court has held that federal prosecution followed by
state prosecution does not violate the double jeopardy clause. In Bartkus v.
Illinois,194 the defendant was acquitted in a federal court of robbing a federally
insured savings and loan association. He then was tried in an Illinois state
court and convicted on substantially the same evidence. The Court held that
the Illinois prosecution after the federal acquittal did not violate the United
States Constitution.1 95
Almost two decades after Bartkus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit faced the same problem in Turley v. Wyrick. 196 Two
armed men were acquitted in federal court of charges of robbing a Missouri
bank in violation of federal law. The State of Missouri then charged one
of the two men with robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous
and deadly weapon, in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes section
560.120.197 The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that his prior federal
acquittal barred the state prosecution. The motion was overruled, the
Supreme Court of Missouri denied a request for a writ of prohibition, and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 98 Ajury then convicted
the defendant of robbery in the first degree and sentenced him to twenty
years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1 99 The defendant filed a petition
192. Id. at 249.
193. Id. at 250.
194. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
195. Id. at 139.
196. 554 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
197. (1969) (current version at Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.020 (1978)).
198. 404 U.S. 1024 (1972) (denial of certiorari after denial of writ of
prohibition).
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for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. The court denied
the writ, and an appeal was taken to the court of appeals. 200 The petitioner
based his right to relief on three grounds: (1) double jeopardy applied even
though two sovereigns were involved, (2) the Ashe v. Swenson201 doctrine of
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion applied, and (3) the state was bound
by the federal acquittal under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution or under federal statute. 20 2 The court affirmed the decision of
the district court. The majority adhered to the traditional view that pros-
ecution by different sovereigns does not violate the double jeopardy clause,
rejected the collateral estoppel argument because different parties were in-
volved, and rejected the full faith and credit argument because violations
of different laws were claimed. 20 3
Judge Lay concurred in the result, but indicated his dissatisfaction with
it. He questioned the vitality of the two sovereign exception to the protec-
tion afforded by the double jeopardy clause. After noting the attitude of
several states on this point, he stated, "Where the interests of the state and
federal governments coincide in the prosecution of a criminal act, as they
do here, the federalism rationale is completely unavailing. When this oc-
curs the accommodation of the interest of the individual should be
paramount." 204 Nonetheless, he concluded, "As an intermediate appellate
judge I realize it is not my singular role to express opinion contrary to
established law. However, recognition of this judicial discipline should not
prevent one from expressing dismay in the use of stare decisis to perpetuate
an injustice."1205
Although the federal double jeopardy clause does not bar state prosecu-
tion after federal prosecution, such prosecution may be foreclosed by a state
statute. For example, an Alaska statute provides, "When an act charged
as a crime is within the jurisdiction of the United States, another state, or
a territory, as well as of this state, a conviction or acquittal in the former
is a bar to the prosecution for it in this state." 20 6 Approximately one-quarter
of the states have such provisions. 20 7 Louisiana, on the other hand, has
200. 554 F.2d at 841.
201. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
202. 554 F.2d at 841.
203. Id. at 841-42.
204. Id. at 844 (Lay, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 844-45 (Lay, J., concurring).
206. ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1980).
207. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.20.010 (1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-112
(1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-108, 43-1224.1 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-1-303 (1978); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1974); GA. CODEANN. § 26-507(c)
(1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(3) (Gum. Supp. 1980); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 505.050 (1975); MONT. CODEANN. § 46-11-504(1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
1982]
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specifically provided that "[d]ouble jeopardy does not apply to a prosecu-
tion under a law enacted by the Louisiana Legislature if the prior jeopardy
was in a prosecution under the laws of another state or the United States.' '208
The Model Penal Code provides:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of this State and of the United States or another State, a pros-
ecution in any such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent pros-
ecution in this State under the following circumstances:
(1) the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction
... and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct,
unless (a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted
or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted
each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law
defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially
different harm or evil or (b) the second offense was not consummated
when the former trial began; or
(2) the former prosecution was terminated, after the information
was filed or the indictment found, by an acquittal or by a final order
or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed
or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be
established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is subse-
quently prosecuted. 29
The Model Penal Code has had a substantial impact on the provisions of
Hawaii 210 and Colorado. 211
In some jurisdictions with no statutes dealing with a state prosecution
following a federal prosecution, courts have interpreted state constitutions
to bar the state prosecution. For example, in People v. Cooper, 21 2 the defen-
§ 2C: 1-11 (West Pamphlet 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 40.20-.30 (McKin-
ney 1971 & Supp. Pamphlet 1980-1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Pur-
don 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1978); VA. CODE § 19.2-294 (1975).
Some state statutes do not specify federal prosecution as a bar to state prosecu-
tion, but have language broad enough to cover this situation. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 656 (West 1970); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1979); IOWA CODE 5 803.4
(1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (West 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 5
25 (West 1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.71 (West 1958).
Some state statutes bar prosecution after federal prosecution for particular of-
fenses, including violation of laws concerning controlled substances. See ALA. CODE
§ 20-2-77 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2533 (Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 5398.23 (West 1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. 5 712-1254 (1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. 5 30-31-27 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.252 (1979); S.C. CODE 5
44-53-410 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 161.45 (West 1974).
208. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 597 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
209. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962).
210. See HAWAII REV. STAT. 5 701-112 (1976).
211. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-303 (1978).
212. 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976).
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dant was acquitted in a federal court on a bank robbery charge and subse-
quently prosecuted in a Michigan state court for attempted murder, bank
robbery, and assault with intent to rob. Michigan has no statute dealing with
this double prosecution for a single event. The Michigan Constitution,
however, provides, "No person shall be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy. "213 The Michigan Supreme Court in a well-reasoned
opinion held that the state constitution "prohibits a second prosecution for
an offense arising out of the same criminal act unless it appears from the
record that the interest of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction which
initially prosecuted are substantially different. "214 The court recognized that
this approach requires a case-by-case analysis, but it noted that the state con-
stitution might forbid a state prosecution after a federal prosecution if both
were based on the same criminal act. 215
The Michigan court indicated that it was adopting the approach used
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Mills. 216 The Mills
court vacated the defendant's conviction for carrying a concealed deadly
weapon, unlawfully carrying a firearm, and aggravated robbery, which con-
viction followed a guilty plea in a federal court to bank robbery and assault.
The Pennsylvania court recognized the importance of the rights of the defen-
dant in the double jeopardy cases and the need for finality. 217 The court found
undesirable the possibility that governments "with all their resources and
power" will make "repeated attempts to convict, thus subjecting the accused
to live in a continuous state of anxiety, insecurity and possible
harassment.' '218 The court concluded that it would allow a second prosecu-
tion in a Pennsylvania court after a federal trial in some cases: "[I]f it ap-
pears that the interests of this Commonwealth were not sufficiently protected
in the initial prosecution, then a second prosecution and imposition of ad-
ditional punishment in Pennsylvania will be allowed." 21 9 In this case, the
record failed to show that the interests of the state were not protected; ac-
cordingly, the state convictions were reversed. 220
A more recent Pennsylvania case on the problem of federal prosecution
followed by state prosecution for crimes arising from the same factual situa-
213. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
214. 398 Mich. at 461, 247 N.W.2d at 870.
215. Id.
216. 447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971).
217. Id. at 171, 286 A.2d at 642.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 172, 286 A.2d at 642.
220. Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently reached the same con-
clusion in the situation where the federal trial resulted in an acquittal. See State v.
Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 385 A.2d 844 (1978). The court left for future adjudication
the situation where the federal adjudication resulted in a conviction. Id. at 267, 385
A.2d at 847.
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tion is Commonwealth v. Grazier.221 Two individuals were acquitted in a federal
court on charges of mail fraud and conspiracy. State criminal complaints
already had been filed in a Pennsylvania court charging the two with ar-
son. After the acquittal in the federal court, the defendants filed an application
to quash the state indictments, claiming double jeopardy and collateral estop-
pel arising from the acquittal in the federal court. The lower court quashed
the indictment, but the superior court reversed and ordered the indictments
reinstated. 2 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the applicability
of Mills and Ashe v. Swenson223 and held that "the concepts embodied in
... [Mills and Ashe] bar a Commonwealth prosecution on arson charges.'"224
The court concluded that although the crimes were different, "both statutes
as used in this case protect the same governmental interest. Under these facts,
Mills will act as a bar to a state prosecution for arson following an acquittal
in federal court for mail fraud in connection with a scheme to commit
arson.' '225
When a federal prosecution is followed by a state prosecution for a crime
committed at the same time as the federal offense, the interests of both
sovereigns are affected as are the interests of the defendant. A state may
forego prosecution after the federal prosecution because of a state statute,
a state court interpretation of state double jeopardy protections, or policy
considerations. 226 On the other hand, the federal government might pro-
hibit the state prosecution. In United States v. Wheeler,227 the United States
Supreme Court noted that although "conflict might be eliminated by making
federal jurisdiction exclusive where it exists, such a 'marked change in the
distribution of powers to administer criminal justice' would not be
desirable. "228
E. Foreign Prosecution Followed by Prosecution in the United States
An act may be an offense both in a state within the United States and
221. 481 Pa. 622, 393 A.2d 335 (1978).
222. Id. at 627, 393 A.2d at 337.
223. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
224. 481 Pa. at 629, 393 A.2d at 338.
225. Id. at 631, 393 A.2d at 339-40. The supreme court also concluded that
a second prosecution would be barred by the concept of issue preclusion because
of the acquittal in the federal court. This is a somewhat novel application of the
doctrine because the commonwealth never had its day in court. The court so held
because of "the degree of federal-state cooperation in the instant investigation"
and because "the Commonwealth admitted in an answer to a bill of particulars that
the evidence it would present would be substantially the same as that presented in
the federal prosecution." Id. at 634, 393 A.2d at 341 n.4.
226. See State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 673, 568 P.2d 199 (1977).
227. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
228. Id. at 318 (followingAbbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)). For
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in a foreign country. 229 When this occurs, the alleged criminal may be sub-ject to multiple prosecutions. Several states have enacted general provisions
that bar a state prosecution following a prosecution in a foreign country. 230
The language used in the statutes varies, but all afford the defendant basically
the same protection. Arizona's statute is typical:
When on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a
criminal prosecution under the laws of the United States, or of
another state or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect
to which he is on trial he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a suf-
ficient defense. 231
The California Supreme Court faced the question of the effect of a foreign
prosecution on a subsequent state prosecution in Coumas v. Superior Court.232
Coumas was born in Greece, had emigrated to the United States in 1907,
and became an American citizen in 1914. The Greek government never con-
sented to his becoming an American citizen. In 1932, Coumas allegedly
murdered one individual and committed an assault with a deadly weapon
on another. Shortly thereafter he fled the country and went to Greece. On
May 12, 1932, Coumas was indicted by a California grand jury and the
United States instituted extradition proceedings. 233 Coumas resisted extradi-
tion, and the Greek court found that he had never divested himself of his
Greek citizenship and that "Greek law therefore absolutely forbade his ex-
tradition but required his prosecution and punishment in Greece in accord-
ance with its criminal law.' '234 Coumas was tried in Greece on the same
charges alleged in California. He was found guilty of manslaughter and the
an example of federal legislation suspending state court jurisdiction to prosecute,
see notes 180 & 181 and accompanying text supra.
229. See, e.g., Coumas v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d 449 (1948).
230. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-112 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE 5§ 656,
793 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27(1972); NEV. REv. STAT. § 171.070,208.020 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 29-03-13
(1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 25 (West 1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5
10.43.040 (1980).
Some state statutes do not specify foreign prosecution as a bar to state prosecu-
tion, but have language broad enough to cover this situation. See IND. CODEANN.
§ 35-41-4-5 (Bums 1979); IOWA CODE 5803.4(1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045
(West 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1817 (1979); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 1.10 (1977);
WIS. STAx. ANN. 5 939.71 (West 1958).
Some state statutes bar prosecution after foreign prosecution for particular of-
fenses, including importing stolen goods and dueling. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §
43-1423 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §5 (West 1970); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 767.64 (1968); Mo. REV. STAT. § 541.050 (1978).
231. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-112 (1978).
232. 31 Cal. 2d 682, 192 P.2d 449 (1948).
233. Id. at 684, 192 P.2d at 450.
234. Id. at 684, 192 P.2d at 451.
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unlawful carrying of a firearm.23 5 When Coumas returned to the United
States he was arrested, whereupon he sought a writ of prohibition. The
California Supreme Court found no fraud, collusion, trickery, or subter-
fuge in Coumas' conduct in Greece.2 36 The court noted that the California
Penal Code provided, "When an act charged as a public offense is within
the jurisdiction of another State or country, as well as of this State, a con-
viction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the prosecution or in-
dictment therefor in this State." ,23 7 The court indicated that this fact situa-
tion fell precisely within the statute and that the writ of prohibition was the
proper method of raising the defense. 238 Coumas appears to be the only rele-
vant case arising under a state statute barring prosecution after a foreign
prosecution.
Absent a statutory provision, a foreign country prosecution probably
will not bar a subsequent state prosecution. The United States Supreme
Court determined in Bartkus v. Illinois239 that the double jeopardy protec-
tion guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
does not extend over jurisdictional lines.2 40 In Bartkus, the Court dis-
missed, as irrelevant, an English line of cases which held that a prosecution
in one jurisdiction barred subsequent prosecution in another. 24 1 The leading
English case was Rex v. Hutchinson 24 Z which is reported in Beak v. Thyrwhit.
24 3
Hutchinson allegedly killed a man in Portugal and was acquitted of murder
there. On returning to England, Hutchinson was reprosecuted for the
murder, and he pleaded and established the former acquittal. 24 4 The judges
all agreed "that he being already acquitted by their [Portugal's] law, could
not be tried again here [England].1"245
In a more recent English case, Rex v. Aughet,246 Aughet, a Belgian soldier
stationed in England, wounded another Belgian soldier and was acquitted
of the offense in a Belgian court-martial. When Aughet returned to England,
the English courts asserted theirjurisdiction and indicted Aughet for a com-
parable offense. The trial court rejected Aughet's plea of autrofois acquit and
found him guilty of malicious wounding. 24 7 The court of criminal appeal
quashed the conviction, noting that "it would be unjust to the prisoner not
235. Id. at 685, 192 P.2d at 451.
236. Id. at 688, 192 P.2d at 452.
237. CAL. PENAL CODE § 793 (West 1970).
238. 31 Cal. 2d at 684, 192 P.2d at 450.
239. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
240. Id. at 127.
241. Id. at 128 n.9.
242. 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1677).
243. 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (1689).
244. Id. at 125.
245. Id.
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to accept a decision of a competent court in his favour." 248 A previous agree-
ment between the English and Belgian governments provided for Belgian
jurisdiction in such a situation. 249 The court found that "it would be con-
trary to the true intent and meaning of the Convention to subject the man
to punishment here for an offence for which he has been in jeopardy and
has been acquitted in accordance with Belgian law.' '250 The current law in
England is consistent with Hutchinson and Aughet. 251
American courts have not accepted the English common law rule. The
general rule in American jurisprudence was stated by the Supreme Court
of Nebraska over 100 years ago:
This is a foreign state, and the principle seems well settled that the
laws of a country do not extend beyond its territorial limits; and
therefore it is said to be "an obvious principle that the maxim and
rule of constitutional law cannot span country and country in such
a way ... [as] to cause a jeopardy in one country to free the party
from trial in another." 252
American courts have been reluctant to allow a foreign country prosecu-
tion to bar a state prosecution. New York enacted two statutes253 in the nine-
teenth century expressly providing for such a bar. 254 Even so, in 1931, a New
York court refused to allow a former conviction in an Italian court to bar
248. Id. at 660.
249. Id. at 659.
250. Id. at 660.
251. "A previous acquittal before a court of competent jurisdiction in a foreign
country is a bar to a subsequent indictment here." 11 H. HALSBURY, THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 242 (4th ed. 1976). See also id. 88.
The English line of cases has been cited by a dissenting judge in a single Penn-
sylvania Superior Court decision. See Commonwealth v. Mills, 217 Pa. Super. Ct.
269, 280, 269 A.2d 322, 327 (1970) (Hoffman,J., dissenting), vacated, 447 Pa. 163,
286 A.2d 638 (1971). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in deciding the case, stated
that "a second prosecution and imposition of punishment for the same offense will
not be permitted unless it appears from the record that the interests of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted and im-
posed punishment are substantially different." 447 Pa. at 171-72, 286 A.2d at 642.
This language seems to be broad enough to cover a foreign country prosecution.
Pennsylvania has since adopted PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 111 (Purdon 1973),
which bars a second state prosecution following a prosecution in another state or
by the United States. The statute is similar to MODEL PENAL CODE 5 111 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1956).
252. Marshall v. State, 6 Neb. 120, 122 (1877) (dictum) (quoting 1J. BISHOP,
CRIMINAL LAW § 983 (4th ed. 1868)).
253. A discussion of the New York statutes is found in People v. Lo Cicero,
14 N.Y.2d 374, 377-78, 200 N.E.2d 622, 623, 251 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955 (1964).
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a New York indictment. 25 5 Evidently, the court based its decision on a pro-
cedural technicality: the defendant did not properly enter the plea.25 6 The
court then stated in self-proclaimed obiter dictum:
Aside from the form and sufficiency of said plea, I am of the opin-
ion that the conviction in the courts of the Kingdom of Italy, in the
absence of specific treaty provisions binding our state courts, can-
not successfully be pleaded in bar to a prosecution under an indict-
ment in this state when it appears that here is where the crime was
committed. 217
New York has since revised its statutes and no longer allows a foreign country
prosecution to bar a subsequent state prosecution for the same offense. 258
F. Indian Court Prosecution Followed by Federal Prosecution
It has been urged that double jeopardy may arise when an individual
has been tried in an Indian tribal court and then is tried in a federal court.
This argument was presented recently to the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Wheeler.259 Anthony Wheeler, a member of the Navajo tribe,
was arrested by a tribal police officer on the Navajo reservation and charged
with disorderly conduct in violation of the tribal code. Wheeler pleaded guilty
to the charge and to a further charge of contributing to the delinquency of
a minor, also in violation of the code, and was sentenced. Over a year later,
Wheeler was indicted by a federal grand jury for statutory rape. Wheeler
attacked the indictment claiming that the tribal proceedings barred any fur-
ther proceedings in a federal court. The trial court rejected the argument
of the prosecutor that there was not an identity of sovereignties between the
tribal court and the federal court and dismissed the indictment. The court
of appeals affirmed the dismissal on double jeopardy grounds.2 60
The United States Supreme Court examined with care the role of tribal
courts and the power of Congress over Indian tribes. The Court decided
that the crucial question was that of "the ultimate source of the power under
which the respective prosecutions were undertaken. "261 The Court viewed
Indian tribes as" 'a separate people, with the power of regulating their in-
ternal and social relations,' ",262 and the powers of the Indian tribes as" 'in-
herent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
255. People v. Papaccio, 140 Misc. 696, 251 N.Y.S. 717 (N.Y. County Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1931).
256. Id. at 698, 251 N.Y.S. at 719.
257. Id. at 698, 251 N.Y.S. at 719-20 (dictum).
258. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§§ 40.20-.30 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. Pam-
phlet 1980-1981).
259. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
260. Id. at 315-16.
261. Id. at 320.
262. Id. at 322 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886)
& Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831)).
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extinguished.' "263 The Court recognized that the tribes are ultimately sub-
ject to federal control, but that the power to govern themselves was not created
by federal law. 264 The Court concluded:
[T]he power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by
Tribe members, which was part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty,
has never been taken away from them, either explicitly or implicitly,
and is attributable in no way to any delegation to them of federal
authority. It follows that when the Navajo Tribe exercises this power,
it does so as part of its retained sovereignty and not as an arm of
the Federal Government.
Since tribal and federal prosecutions are brought by separate
sovereigns, they are not "for the same offence," and the Double
Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one when the other has
occurred. 265
The Court also considered the impact of barring federal prosecution
and concluded that the federal interest in prosecuting major offenses that
occur on tribal reservations might be frustrated. 266 The Court recognized
that Congress, "in the exercise of its plenary power over the tribes," 267 could
give exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over crimes committed on




Although duplicative prosecutions in different jurisdictions for a single
criminal act are theoretically possible, it is not a common occurrence. Because
of the geographical limitations on state court jurisdiction, a single act rarely
will be a crime in more than one state. Under the Petite policy, a state pro-
secution usually will not be followed by a federal prosecution. Similarly, many
state statutes bar a state prosecution after a federal prosecution or after pro-
secution in a foreign country.
The trend is clearly against dual prosecution for a single act, even though
two jurisdictions are involved. Such prosecution is possible, but as a prac-
tical matter duplicative prosecutions rarely will occur. Perhaps it is time to
reconsider whether the constitutional double jeopardy bar against duplicative
prosecutions for a single act might not apply even when two jurisdictions
are involved. Judge Lay of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
263. 435 U.S. at 322 (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 122 (1945)).
264. 435 U.S. at 327-28.
265. Id. at 328-30 (footnotes omitted).
266. Id. at 331.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 332.
19821
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Circuit has indicated his dissatisfaction with the possibility of duplicative
prosecutions. He questioned the vitality of the two-sovereign exception to
the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. Perhaps otherjudges
should recognize the present trend and put a constitutional imprimatur on
the barring of duplicative prosecutions in different jurisdictions. 269
V. MULTIPLEJURISDICTIONS-SINGLE EVENT-MULTIPLE CRIMES
The final situation to be considered is a combination of the situations
discussed above, i.e., when an individual commits several crimes and violates
the laws of multiple jurisdictions. For example, the person who breaks into
several residential mail boxes at approximately the same time may have com-
mitted several crimes under both state and federal law. 270 Under the apparent
law today, the actor in a series of criminal acts might be subjected to serial
prosecutions by different governments. Should different governments be
allowed to prosecute a single individual for different crimes that occurred
in the same episode? Or should an individual be protected from any harass-
ment or persecution that might result from successive-prosecutions? 271
A body of law exists that forces an authority to prosecute in large units
and not serially; 272 a body of law also exists under which a prosecution by
one authority will bar a prosecution by a second authority. 273 If these prin-
ciples are generally accepted, should not these be taken in combination to
preclude serial prosecutions by more than one authority for different crimes
arising out of the same episode? One solution might be to allow prosecu-
tion by one jurisdiction for a felony of the severity approximating the most
serious one that could be charged by any of the jurisdictions involved. Such
a prosecution would bar any further prosecutions for the same criminal
episode. This would protect the criminal actor and still foreclose the possibility
of gamesmanship 274 by a prosecutor or a defendant who would use the prin-
ciple to avoid the imposition of appropriate sanctions.
269. See State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 673, 568 P.2d 199 (1977). The dual
sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy limitation does not apply in every situa-
tion when successive prosecutions occur in different jurisdictions. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that a soldier who had been acquitted by a military court
on a charge of murder could not be tried by a territorial court, that there could not
be successive prosecutions by federal and territorial courts because they are created
by the same sovereign, and that city and state could not prosecute successively for
"unlawful conduct growing out of the same episode." See United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1978).
270. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1705, 1708 (1976).
271. These principles underlie preclusion on the civil side as well as the bar
against double jeopardy on the criminal side.
272. See Part III. supra.
273. See Part IV. supra.
274. See notes 182-93 and accompanying text supra.
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The problem was posed in a recent prosecution of an individual for killing
two black men who had been jogging with two white women. The United
States prosecuted the assailant for a violation of the civil rights of the two
blacks, and the defendant was convicted.27 5 The state government then pro-
secuted the defendant for murder under state law, and he was convicted
again.27 6 This case involved multiple wrongs in the same episode and the
violation of the laws of two different jurisdictions. Potential problems might
have arisen, however, if the federal government had prosecuted for the viola-
tion of the civil rights of one of the two killed, and then the state had pros-
ecuted the defendant for the murder of the other. Would this have been per-
mitted? Or would the sequence have seemed so contrived that it would not
have been sanctioned? What benefits would accrue from such a scenario?
Would this not be the harassment-the game playing and the persecution-
that is to be avoided? Are these not the very evils that the concept of double
jeopardy, the Petite policy, and various state statutes aim to eliminate?277
Current statutes, policies, and constitutional considerations generally
should bar repetitive prosecutions by different authorities for the crimes of
an episode, even though several persons were injured, just as in the case of
a single victim. The trend of the law today foreshadows requiring an elec-
tion of a single proceeding for the vindication of the interests of the public
in a multi-victim, multi-jurisdiction situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
An examination of the different situations when a defendant may be pro-
secuted more than once for a single event suggests that several variables must
be examined to reach a conclusion. Some constants, however, do unify these
different situations.
The first is the defendant's interest in being subjected to only one pro-
secution. Since the principle of not allowing duplicative prosecutions by a
single sovereign is accepted generally, should not this general principle also
apply when more than one jurisdiction is involved? 278 In most situations,
275. United States v. Franklin, No. CR-80-00125 (D. Utah Mar. 4, 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 81-13-43 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 1981).
276. State v. Franklin, No. CR81-498 (Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah Sept.
19, 1981).
277. Issue preclusion applied in criminal prosecutions also may reduce harass-
ment and persecution. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
278. When double jeopardy is stated as a general principle, it is phrased in terms
of protecting
an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible con-
viction more than once for an alleged offense .... The underlying idea
... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
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the concerns of the various governments are identical. The punishment of
the criminal for the wrong committed is the end sought. The vindication
of the interests of one government satisfies the interests of another. Thus,
no rationale justifies a duplicative prosecution under principles of federalism.
Second, perhaps the expenditure of society's resources in duplicative
prosecutions in or between jurisdictions cannot be justified. The costs in-
volve the courts, the defendants, the prosecutors, the witnesses, the defense
attorneys, and a host of persons on the periphery of the prosecution. Although
issue preclusion may reduce the repetitive aspects of duplicative actions, the
effect will be minimal. The result of the duplication often is nothing more
than a gesture-a sentence that will have no real effect on the defendant.
When the cost of such prosecutions is weighed against the results obtained,
duplicative prosecution may not be justified.
Third, society is best served by procedures that allow for a speedy ter-
mination of the judicial process. Allowing multiple prosecutions does not
serve this desirable end.
Fourth, society's interests are served by consistency in judicial decisions.
If results are inconsistent, the prestige of the courts suffers. It is difficult for
laymen to understand how different courts can reach different results in the
same factual situation. If the government is allowed to seek a second pros-
ecution because the first has terminated in favor of the defendant, inconsis-
tent decisions are possible.
Arguments to the contrary are based on the need for severe punishment
if multiple crimes have been committed, the right of each sovereign to punish
as it sees fit,2179 the need for prosecutorial discretion, and the desirability of
allowing the prosecution a second chance if it fails the first time. This last
argument seems specious, but it has been urged by the Supreme Court
because of the idiosyncratic character of juries and the state's inability to
appeal if it loses. 2 0
The answers in this area may not be absolute. Variable factors may con-
trol each situation. The United States Supreme Court has called attention
to one possible difficulty with the application of double jeopardy when two
sovereigns are involved. The Court suggested that "prosecution by one
sovereign for a relatively minor offense might bar prosecution by the other
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Under this general princi-
ple, it is difficult to see how duplicative prosecutions by different sovereigns can
be allowed if a single criminal act is involved and the Constitution of the United
States governs.
279. For an example of the use of duplicative prosecutions in a seemingly ap-
propriate manner, see notes 275 & 276 and accompanying text supra.
280. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
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for a much graver one, thus effectively depriving the latter of the right to
enforce its own laws.' '281 The possibility of such an arrangement suggests
that the bar of the earlier prosecution should not be absolute. A government
that has a valid reason for punishing an individual should not be foreclosed
because some other government has prosecuted without a true desire to bring
the criminal to justice.
Perhaps the power of the federal government to prosecute individuals
should be viewed, at least in part, as a power in reserve to ensure the
reasonable operation of the criminal justice system. 282 When an egregious
miscarriage of justice occurs at the state level through an acquittal, the
availability of federal prosecution might be viewed as beneficial in allow-
ing a second prosecution. The failure to convict in a state court may be
remedied by a prosecution under the civil rights statutes or some other federal
criminal provision. 283 This compares to the civil rights removal statutes that
allow a defendant in a state court criminal prosecution to remove the pro-
ceeding to the federal court to avoid a state court miscarriage of justice by
an unjustified conviction. 284 Similar federal supervision exists in the habeas
corpus provisions that sometimes allow a federal court to second-guess the
state court. 28
5
In Bartkus v. Illinois26 the Supreme Court, in discussing the problem
of duplicative prosecutions, stated:
The entire history of litigation and contention over the ques-
tion of the imposition of a bar to a second prosecution by a govern-
ment other than the one first prosecuting is a manifestation of the
evolutionary unfolding of law. Today a number of States have
statutes which bar a second prosecution if the defendant has been
once tried by another government for a similar offense. 28 7
The Court concluded that the matter should be handled by the states and
that the Court should "not utilize the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere
with this development." 28 8 The Court just as easily might have concluded
that the problem required a single, unified solution that could be provided
only by the federal government and, more specifically, the Supreme Court.
281. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 318 (1978) (footnote omitted).
282. While Congress has been considering the revision and codification of the
federal criininal law, the problem of duplicative prosecutions has been considered.
See S. 1722, 96th Cong., lst Sess., §§ 205-206 (1979); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., §§ 115-117 (1980).
283. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 (1976).
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976).
285. See id. § 2241.
286. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
287. Id. at 138.
288. Id. at 138-39.
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Even absent the possibly overriding constitutional considerations, courts
easily may conclude that, under case law, statutes, or state constitutions,
duplicative prosecutions should not be allowed. 289 Prosecuting authorities
may adopt written or unwritten policies, such as the Petite policy, that preclude
duplicative prosecutions. 290 The trend in the law today is clearly moving
toward protecting defendants from unwarranted duplicative prosecutions.
The principle may never become as clear as claim preclusion on the civil
side, 291 but, nonetheless, the general principle is gaining support on the
criminal side. Just as the concept of claim preclusion on the civil side is subject
to exceptions, the developing law on the criminal side recognizes that some
situations exist under which a second prosecution must be allowed. This
development is consistent with preclusion's underlying basis. Preclusion
reflects the needs of society; it is based on the need to use the courts' time
wisely, to promote respect for the judicial system, and to prevent harass-
ment of persons in the courts. Perhaps there should be a presumption in favor
of preclusion. Preclusion is, however, not an absolute; it is a proposition
that must stand or fall on its essential value. When society's interests are
best served by using preclusion, it should be adopted. When society's in-
terests are best served by a rejection of preclusion because of some overriding
contrary consideration, it should not control.
289. See Parts III. & IV. supra.
290. See notes 182-93 and accompanying text supra.
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